CHAPTER 5
BEYOND THE POLITICAL CHAOS: WHERE ARE WE GOING?

We began this study by describing the divided and chaotic political
landscape in the United States at the beginning of the 21st century. The
United States finds itself without clear political direction, in the
midst of a particularly polarized time. We argued that this confusion is
being prolonged by a style of discourse that cuts political action off
from its ideological roots and thus retards the normal process of
political give and take and the resulting emergence of democratic legitimacy.
We focused on political ideology as the fabric woven from public
understanding of the world, public values that shape choice, and visions the
public longs to make real. We thus called for attention to rhetorical
strategies that motivate political action by knitting it into this
fabric of ideology. A careful study of political positions as a symbolic
resource for this purpose followed. We called for language strategies
rather than stands on issues to organize the political landscape. Analysis
of language strategies opens a vista on attitudes toward change,
rhetorical strategies, political frames, and public motives that tie
political action to ideology. We defended such attention to reuniting action
and ideology as critical to the functioning of a healthy democracy.
At times like these, times of polemic politics in which the center
fails to hold and the political extremes exercise power, the attention to
language strategies has another important advantage. With these
strategies to help us gaze through the political fog, we can work with the
current political viewpoints from a broader perspective. Rather than simply
seeing the current chaotic political atmosphere as malignant, we can
view it as a transition to a reoriented political landscape to come.
Because the language strategies are not tied to the issues of the current
miasma, we can discern the emergence of new issues around which the next
political configuration will turn. With the methods we have developed
in this study, we now project today's politics into the future to see
how political discourse is most likely to evolve in the coming years. The
seeming chaos and conflict of the present reveals the potentialities of
a profound transformation in American culture and politics.

In the Midst of a Paradigm Shift

We argue that the chaos we described in Chapter 1 is more than the
reversal of party labels. We believe it reflects a deep potentiality for a
transformation in our culture as the stability of the prevailing
scientific worldview gives way to a new, more complex and comprehensive way
of understanding the world. The ways of thinking tied to an earlier
scientific age are giving way to a new paradigm.1
To explore the implications of this evolution we begin by examining the
relationships between the political middle and the political extremes
in uncertain times. During periods of stability and incremental change,
the rhetorical strategies of the political middle dominate a well
functioning public discourse. At moments of intense polarity, however, the
rhetorical strategies of the political extremes become critical. At the
ends of the political spectrum, the left attempts to move the middle
toward greater equality and the right urges greater social control.
The visions that frame this polarized moment are evolving in the face
of a deep social transformation. We look at the drift of society over
time, at structural elements that enable society to move with the drift,
and at language choices invoked to define, justify, and resist this
drift. We emphasize how the language emerging at the extreme ends of the
political spectrum is pushing and pulling the political center into a
new direction. By looking at the pushing and pulling, we are able to see
tensions, extensions, and contradictions to allow us to predict the new
reshaped middle.
Once again, Kenneth Burke gives us a framework for exploring major
changes in the orientations that provide cohesion to how people explain and
understand their world. He discusses how society has moved in
evolutionary stages from an orientation of magic to religion and from religion
to science. Each stage, Burke argues, grows out of the contradictions
and limitations of the previous period. He predicts that science, the
dominant paradigm for more than three centuries, will give way to poetic
humanism, an orientation toward the world that stresses collective
concerns over individual benefit, ways of knowing beyond the senses, and an
expanded sense of human possibility.2
Transformations of this magnitude are never easy or clear cut.3 But
they are signaled by a breakdown in established categories and ways of
explaining the world. Today there is a growing sense among activists and
analysts alike that we are experiencing such changes. Something very
different is evolving in our political world. For some, it is a deep
structural change marking the end of what is called the neo-liberal ideology
that has undergirded the philosophy of government in the western world
for more than fifty years.4 For others it is the end of the political
coalitions that have governed the country since the mid twentieth
century.5 The sense that we are entering a new time is widespread. Kevin
Phillips, writing about the relationship between democracy and wealth over
the past three centuries, has described the unsettledness that marks
this current period of transition:

            New centuries have often been stress points in the
psychology, if not the immediate fortunes, of the world's leading economic
powers. Like its predecessors, the United States found its uncertainties
rising sharply as the calendar turned. …The hung presidential election of
2000, for its part, fed skepticism about the US electoral system.
September 11 added a grave concern about the future of American domestic and
international security.6
There is a growing consensus that the transition into the new century
is more than a change of date. It marks an emergence of new
sensibilities, a new consciousness and way of looking at the world. It is a time of
extraordinary possibilities and enormous dangers. For some it is the
possibility of the restoration of a more moral America. For others, there
are the dark portends of emerging fascism. For some it is the
possibility of a new democracy. Commenting from a liberal perspective, Paul Ray
and Sherry Anderson capture the sense of transformation in their work
on creative cultural change when they say simply, "A whole new culture
is emerging, with a greater promise than most of us have dared to
dream."7
The promise of a more liberal, democratic future seems utopian in a
world marked with war, terrorism, and brutality. Yet we believe that
historically the United States has found ways to move toward an ever more
inclusive and egalitarian society.8 The drift of the last three hundred
years, with all its imperfections, has been toward a deeper and more
expansive understanding of democracy. In the past, when confronted with
choices between protecting privilege and becoming more inclusive,
Americans have consistently moved on a path toward greater equality. 9 As
Martin Luther King, Jr., said, "The arch of the universe is long, but it
bends toward justice."
There are clear signs to indicate that a deep cultural transformation
is under way today. We are moving away from the paradigm of science,
toward a more inclusive sense of community. This drift is not
predetermined. Nor is history necessarily a guide to a more open future, for it
holds as many lessons of despair as of hope.10 The present, however, can
be understood as part of a larger pattern of transition in American life
helping to define the contours of a paradigm shift toward the
communitarian, humanistic principles embodied in Burke's notion of poetic
humanism.
In times of uncertainty and change, Burke's insights about how language
shapes reality and influences actions are especially helpful in trying
to understand where we are and where we are headed. Burke gives us ways
to think about the future by looking dialectically at contradictions
emerging in the present from the patterns that were formed in the past.
He directs our thinking to incongruities and paradoxes, stretching
terms, stealing back and forth symbols, and snapping words into their
opposites.

Two Views of Change

The history of the United States is marked by two related experiences
of change: incremental and dramatic. Much of the time we experience
incremental change. The center of American politics shares a broad
consensus of values, beliefs, and policies and disagrees over the pace and
extent of change, but not over its fundamental direction. In times of
incremental change the political middle is generally a stable core, bound
together by a cohesive set of values. Whatever the particular
disagreements on policy, this stable core represents a coherent middle with a
shared set of beliefs. Historian Richard Hofstader, reflecting on the
development of American political traditions observes that there has been a
strong "unity of culture and political tradition, upon which American
culture has stood."11 This center, sometimes called the "American
creed,"12 rests on a particular interpretation of the American experiment.
During periods dominated by incremental change, the radical left and
reactionary right represent smaller minorities. They are often isolated and
marginal. The general drift of society is accepted, with disagreements
emphasizing pace and manner of change. During the late 1950s and the
presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, for example, there was broad agreement
on the need to extend support for public education. While political
parties of the center disagreed on the means and extent of programs,
support for the goal was widespread. Likewise, the basic outline of the
structures and systems that supported the drift toward greater access to
education for all young people of the country was accepted by the middle.
At other moments, change has been swift and intense. In these moments
of dramatic change, the more intense perspectives of the political
extremes drown out the stable, cautious voices of the middle. Sometimes it
is the voice of the radical left urging pragmatic change: expansion of
the vote, limitation of corporate power, or creation of progressive laws
to protect working people and the environment. Other times it is of the
reactionary right urging the restoration of American ideals and
purpose.
The radical left usually challenges the basic structures of society,
arguing for significant change to accelerate the drift toward equality.
Most often this radical challenge begins within the margins of social
movements. The movements for women suffrage, abolition, farmer
cooperatives, labor rights, civil rights, and environmental justice are all
examples of polarized moments, initiated within the extreme that then
persuading the middle to adopt significant structural change. For example,
Richard Nixon as a center-right president accepted many of the Great
Society programs such as Model Cities and rent subsidies initiated by his
more liberal democratic predecessor, Lyndon Johnson.13
The extreme right, on the other hand, usually challenges the basic
drift of the society and rejects the structures supporting it. It is
labeled reactionary because it is reacting against the drift toward the new
structure. Because the right focuses upon individuals before the
collectivity, the right's route to creating greater equality in the world
occurs through individual and privatized means (which opposes the
collective and governmental means emphasized on the left). The right highlights
the need for stability and control and for the preservation of
traditional values. The right and left have alternative routes to conclusions
because of the strategy emphasized. The right's focus upon individuals
before the collective may not be the most direct route to creating
equality in the world, but the left's focus upon the scene and the
collective before the individual may not be the most direct route to cultivating
individual talent and successes.

Push and Pull Between the Extremes

In our view, polarized moments emerge because of the pull toward the
radical vision. That pull begins to influence the middle, provoking the
reactionary right into intense entrenchment and restoration practices.
From the very beginnings of the republic, the drift of the society,
however imperfectly, has been compelled by the radical tradition, pushing
and pulling the body politic toward a more open and generous democracy.
At other periods, in reaction to this drift, the United States has been
pushed toward private interests, protecting property, and establishing
order. This pattern was first set in the two great founding documents:
the radical Declaration of Independence with its commitment to equality
as self-evident, and the Constitution with its promise of "domestic
tranquility" and greater prosperity. Phillips has referred to this dynamic
as the push between a radical/liberal vision of brotherhood and
equality versus a reactionary/conservative vision of the accumulation of
private wealth.14 This push and pull between the political extremes and its
effects on the values and policies of the political middle are the
foundation of American political cycles.15 The push and pull between the
two extremes and the drift toward democracy has been described in various
terms. Writing in 1841, Ralph Waldo Emerson noted, "the party of
Conservatism and that of Innovation are very old…Innovation is the salient
energy; Conservatism the pause on the last movement." Later, Henry Adams
identified swings between "centralization and diffusion of national
energy." He was followed in the early twentieth century by the work of
Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., who talked about the swings "between conservatism
and liberalism, between periods of concern for the rights of the few
and periods of concern for the wrongs of the many."16
The resolution of these polarities moves the nation as a whole forward
to a new consensus on what is normal or ordinary. Each swing holds with
it the newly forged agreements. Schlesinger, Sr., argued that political
cycles could be best understood as a "spiral" that moved the nation
closer to equality with each swing, establishing the drift to the left end
of the political spectrum. He observed that after each swing from the
left back to the right, "liberal reforms usually survived after
conservatives regained power." Thus the appropriate image "was the spiral in
which alternation proceeded at successively higher levels and allowed for
the accumulation of change."17 Building on these earlier works, his son
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., described cycles of American politics "as a
continuing shift in national involvement, between public purpose and
private interest." 18 The cycles are characterized by periods of relative
stability and great polarization. In the current moment, the period of
polarization is intensified by the deeper paradigm shift that undergirds
the more predictable patterns of change.

                          Polarized Moments Give Rise to Dramatic
Change

Dramatic change emerges during polarized moments. Such moments evolve
as those on the radical left end of the spectrum intensify the drift
toward equality by challenging existing structures. This provokes the
reactions of the extreme right. Increasing polarization of the middle marks
the precondition for significant cultural and political change.
Polarized moments develop as the differing visions characteristic of
the extremes compete for the allegiance of those in the middle. Since the
early 1960s the United States has been in a period of deepening
polarization. The deepening has an ebb and flow, but by the beginning of the
new century, national opinion polls indicated that the country was
divided almost in half on every major issue. Commenting on the election in
2004, Immanuel Wallerstein said:
But it is clear that the electorate is both extremely polarized and
almost evenly divided. The Republican Party has perhaps never been so
aggressively right wing since 1936 (and they were trounced in that
election). And the Democratic Party has never been so passionate in opposition
to an incumbent president. The slogan, "anyone but Bush," is heard
everywhere.19

The beginnings of this division can be found with the development of
the civil rights movement. In the early 1960s the battle over civil
rights and full integration of African-Americans ushered in a period of
increasingly polarized political activity as people organized to create
greater social and economic equality and for greater participation in the
life of the nation. Radical movements such as black power, followed by
women's liberation, ecology, disarmament, alternative energy, and
sustainable development all stimulated a reaction.
In discussing the implications of polarity, Kevin Phillips explained,
"Levels of dissatisfaction like those seen between 1968 and 1994 rarely
dissolve in anything less than a truly new economic and political era."
In the context of the 2000 election and the subsequent attacks on the
World Trade Center and the launching of a war on terror, Phillips
emphasized that we face a new context in which "the shape of a new radicalism
was critical."20 It is out of the contest between two competing
visions, that of the radical left and that of the reactionary right that the
contours of American politics shaping the future will emerge.

Competing Visions

The radical left has had a stable vision for more than 150 years,
emphasizing social and economic equality. Radicals embrace the drift of
society toward equality and emphasize the role of structure or in Burke's
terms "agency" in moving society more fully toward that end. Radicals,
while accepting the drift, reject the existing structures or system and
generate new means to advance equality. Framed by ideas of the
enlightenment that propelled the American and French revolutions, the vision of
equality has deep roots in notions of reason, limited government, and
common action. For much of the past century, the dominant articulation
of this vision was within the ideological framework of socialist theory.
Anarchists, communists, and socialist formations represented the far
left end the spectrum. Labor unions, liberal democrats and a host of
advocacy groups associated with movements of the 1960s represented the
liberal position. But with the fall of the Soviet Union in the waning days
of the last century, the radical left lost focus. Still, arguing from
agency, or means and structure, the radical vision of equality persists
as a utopian ideal.

The Left's Vision Expands

In the late 1990s an expanded radical vision began to develop in
response to the expansion of transnational capitalism and the ideological
framework of neo-liberalism. The expanded vision burst onto the public
stage in the Battle of Seattle in 1999. The organized opposition to the
meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicated a new group of
civil actors reinvigorating the radical political scene. Drawing upon the
earlier vision, the new radicals expanded to embrace principles of
ecology, sustainable development, local action, spirituality, and cultural
activism. Both the media and the Secretary General of the United
Nations have referred to them as a "new world superpower.21
Since the initial protest of the WTO, literally thousands of
individuals and groups have traveled the globe to challenge the arrangements of
international corporate capital, demanding greater transparency in
decision making, in economic justice and human rights, and in sustainable
development. Uniting under a banner proclaiming "another world is
possible," many groups see themselves as part of a radical civil society made
up of locally based organizations responding to the ravages of global
capital. They have been consciously broadening their scope of action
positioning themselves as the representatives of a new global civil
network in opposition to the corporate, governmental structure. Almost
without notice, they have set the stage for a new form of collective action
and have become a potent force in world politics, swelling in number
from a few thousand organizations a decade ago to tens of thousands today
(more than 20,000 of them international or transnational) and from
fewer than 300 recognized by the United Nations in 1970 to close to 3000
today. Such newly emerging formations are developing networks of
political activists, grass-roots groups, social movements, and coalitions in
what has been dubbed "global civil society."22 They are defining a
powerful resistance movement to counter runaway globalization and
neo-liberalism.
The language choices found within this newly emerging radical movement
still emphasize the twin concerns of the radical political orientation.
They emphasize the rejection of the current structural arrangements of
society and an effort to accelerate the movement of society as a whole
toward equality and justice. This consistency of language choice is
evident in the work of Naomi Klein who has helped define the new
radicalism. As a radical she decided to join the "anybody but Bush" camp and
engage in an electoral campaign to emphasize the importance of thinking
about structural relationships (agency) rather than personalities
(agent).
It's worth remembering that it was under Bill Clinton that the
progressive movements in the west began to turn our attention to systems again:
corporate globalization, even - gasp - capitalism and colonialism. We
began to understand modern empire not as the purview of a single nation,
no matter how powerful, but a global system of interlocking states,
international institutions and corporations, an understanding that allowed
us to build global networks in response, from the World Social Forum to
Indymedia. Innocuous leaders who spout liberal platitudes while
slashing welfare and privatizing the planet push us to better identify those
systems and to build movements agile and intelligent enough to confront
them.23

                       The Right's Vision Responds

The reactionary right, too, has had a stable vision of the future for
more than 150 years. Since the earliest days of abolition and the rising
industrial economy of the North, the reactionary right has advocated a
unified perspective rooted in its view of God's purpose for America and
an interpretation of the natural order of the world. Arguing from
purpose and principle the reactionary extreme holds as its view that God has
ordained America to fulfill the "best hope of man." In this view the
United States has a Divine mission that can only be accomplished when
those ordained by God to be in charge rule. Generally, this vision places
a man at the head of the family and the nation. In the well-ordered
universe they have a duty to make decisions, accumulate resources, and
have dominion over the land. The effort to fulfill this destiny has been
thwarted by the erosion of culture through the corrupt influence of
people of color, women, liberals, gay and lesbian people, and selfish
individuals. In this vision the reactionary right longs for the restoration
of a stable and controlled community, with men at the head of their
households and all others in their proper place.24 The extreme reactionary
right is represented by such organizations as the KKK, the America Nazi
Party, the John Birch Society, Skinheads, the Posse Comitatus or
Militia Movement, and the Christian Identity Movement. The conservative arm
of the Republican party is usually represented by such figures as Barry
Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. Moving toward the
middle of the spectrum are moderate republicans like Dwight Eisenhower,
Nelson Rockefeller, and Richard Nixon.
The tenacity of this vision, and a more reactionary expression, can be
seen in the words of Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell shortly after the
attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Falwell spoke on Robertson's
700 Club about the cause of the attacks: "What we saw on Tuesday, as
terrible as it is, could be miniscule if, in fact, God continues to lift
the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what
we deserve." Robertson expressed his agreement. Then Falwell went on:
The ACLU has got to take a lot of blame for this. And I know I'll hear
from them for this, but throwing God...successfully with the help of
the federal court system...throwing God out of the public square, out of
the schools, the abortionists have got to bear some burden for this
because God will not be mocked and when we destroy 40 million little
innocent babies, we make God mad...I really believe that the pagans and the
abortionists and the feminists and the gays and the lesbians who are
actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People
for the American Way, all of them who try to secularize America...I
point the thing in their face and say you helped this happen.25
Over the last three decades, the extreme reactionary right vision has
been gaining power within the more moderate and middle of society. The
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 signaled the triumph of the right that
had been struggling since 1964 to move the Republican Party away from
the more center-liberal positions that had dominated the middle since
the New Deal coalition of Franklin Roosevelt. For the next 25 years there
was a strong pull toward the reactionary ends of the spectrum,
emphasizing stability, Christian values, control and the use of military power.
The so-called culture wars, for example, dominated much of the
political debate during this period. Prayer in school, abortion, public
displays of the ten commandments, the role of fundamentalist Christian values
in public policy and the sense of the United States as a chosen nation
were interwoven in public debates, policies, and programs.26 In the
presidential election of 2004, the reactionary Christian right was widely
credited with the Bush victory as exit polls showed that values were
considered more important than the war on terror, the war in Iraq, or the
economy.27
For the last two decades of the twentieth century and into the
beginning of the 21st, the extreme reactionary right has had the most influence
on the conservative and middle positions. It has even pulled the
liberal positions toward the right end of the political spectrum, isolating
radicals. The victory of George W. Bush for a second term in 2004
demonstrated the vast electoral appeal of the right-reactionary vision of a
stable, controlled, purposeful America to a narrow majority of voters.
At the same time, the traditional vision of the reactionary right has
begun to reveal tensions. A new group of reactionary-conservative
thinkers and organizers nurtured under the Reagan and Bush administrations
began to articulate a more reactionary agenda. As the ideology within
this new group began to evolve, these neo-conservatives rejected the more
traditional isolationist, small government views of the political
right. They demonstrated a willingness to use government to foster a
fundamentalist Christian-based social agenda and to use American military
power to achieve political and economic ends on a global scale. The
neo-conservative vision exerted influence on the center, moving it into the
general policies of the Republican Party under George W. Bush.28
Extreme Visions Engage the Middle

We have noted that the struggle between polar visions to influence the
middle dominates political discourse in times of dramatic change. Even
in periods of incremental change, it is the vision of the extremes that
animates the ideological visions projected toward the middle. Liberals
and those on the left to center are influenced by the radical ideology,
and conservatives and those on the right to center are influenced by
the reactionary ideology.
To project the direction of American politics we look first at the
major polarities dominating the present and at how they are changing the
mainstream. For as politics evolve, elements of each of the extreme
visions become accepted or rejected by the broad middle. For example, the
core right wing value of individual achievement is broadly accepted by
the middle, just as the core left wing value of racial equality is now a
widely held value.
Over the last few decades, four primary tension points or contested
perspectives have framed the pull for stability and control and the push
toward equality. They are expressed in the following polarities:
"	Christian fundamentalist culture vs. pluralistic culture
"	Hierarchical society vs. egalitarian society
"	Controlled, obedient, populace vs. creative, critically questioning
individuals
"	American exceptionalism and nationalism with the unilateral use of
force vs. international cooperation and negotiation with the growth of
international institutions
These polarities are dialectical opposites that provide the framework
for the radical and reactionary visions as they currently influence
discourse by attracting and influencing the middle.
Democrats, for example, who are generally within the liberal to left
end of the political continuum, tend toward a more multicultural, less
hierarchical, feminine, creative worldview and prefer emphasizing
cooperative international action to achieve American goals. Republicans, who
are generally within the conservative to right end of the spectrum tend
toward a more Christian, male, hierarchical, controlled worldview and
believe in the use of unilateral force when necessary to achieve
American goals. In a tongue in cheek column in the New York Times, David
Brooks captured these differing orientations in a column about likely
campaign contributors in the 2004 presidential election:
There are two sorts of people in the information-age elite, spreadsheet
people and paragraph people. Spreadsheet people work with numbers, wear
loafers and support Republicans. Paragraph people work with prose,
don't shine their shoes as often as they should and back Democrats.29
Within the framework of these dialectical opposites, the political
middle attempts to carve out areas for discussion, agreement, compromise,
and policies. The capacity of the political middle to hold a broadly
shared consensus can be seen in the presidential campaign of 2004. George
W. Bush and John Kerry reflected several major areas of agreement.
While the election was characterized by negative and often bitter policy
disagreements, both candidates articulated shared perspectives,
indicating their understanding of the arguments most likely to influence the
political middle. At the same time, they were able to distinguish
themselves within each area, simultaneously creating a sense of where they were
unified and where divided.
Both candidates, for example, accepted a view of the country as more
culturally diverse than just two decades earlier. Bush, as a right of
center Republican portrayed an inclusive view of leadership, indicating
the degree to which the drift toward multiculturalism has become a part
of the general society. During his first term as President, Bush
appointed African Americans, Hispanics, and women to high cabinet positions
and ran a campaign that overtly projected a multicultural image. At the
Republican nominating convention, Arnold Schwarzenegger illustrated the
conservative position emphasizing individual achievement with the
general acceptance of all who share in a core set of beliefs, regardless of
ethnic or cultural differences. Drawing on his own story as a poor
immigrant who achieved success, he said:
To my fellow immigrants listening tonight, I want you to know how
welcome you are in this party. We Republicans admire your ambition. We
encourage your dreams. We believe in your future. One thing I learned about
America is that if you work hard and play by the rules, this country is
truly open to you. You can achieve anything…in this country it doesn't
make any difference where you were born. It doesn't make any difference
who your parents were…America gave me opportunities, and my immigrant
dreams came true.30

 While acknowledging this drift toward equality and the view of a more
multicultural society, Bush extended rhetorical and strategic
connections to the more reactionary extremes in his party by limiting his
acceptance of multiculturalism to people of color and immigrant groups.
Consistent with a conservative view, people from these groups were accepted
not as representatives of a collective culture or identity, but as
individuals who had triumphed over adversity to achieve success.31 Also
consistent with his conservative-reactionary stance, Bush made clear his
rejection of the drift toward greater inclusion. He drew the line of
inclusion at people in same sex relationships. To underscore his rejection
of the drift Bush endorsed several statewide initiatives to ban same
sex marriage and backed an amendment to the Constitution on this issue.
Bush moved further toward the reactionary position as he rejected the
existing structural mechanisms designed to encourage multiculturalism.
Early in his first term, for example, Bush directed the Justice
Department to abandon its historic support for Affirmative Action and to argue
against race as a factor in university admissions in the University of
Michigan case brought before the Supreme Court.32
John Kerry, as a liberal Democrat, joined Bush in his opposition to
same sex marriage, separating himself from the extreme left end of the
spectrum. However, Kerry made rhetorical and strategic connections to the
radical vision of inclusion. He spoke in favor of civil unions and an
end to discrimination against all people. Further Kerry differed with
Bush on Affirmative Action, defending it as an important and needed
structural mechanism.
On international issues similar areas of agreement and disagreement
were evident. Both Bush and Kerry agreed with the decision to invade Iraq.
Kerry, the Democrat, functioning within the liberal perspective,
emphasized the role of multinational action while Bush, the Republican,
insisted on the right of the United States to act alone in its own interest.
Kerry accepted the idea of the United Nations as an important
international body while Bush, again in a bow to the reactionary viewpoint,
disparaged it, defending the "doing it alone" attitude of the
reactionaries.
People in the middle then move along the continuum between the opposite
polls, differing on both the extent to which they support the drift of
the society and the degree to which they are willing to embrace or
alter structures. The lens through which people evaluate the world and
respond to issues further differentiates the positions of individuals,
parties, and organizations on the political continuum. For the
middle-right-conservative the role of individuals, or in Burke's terms, agent, is
essential. In Schwarzenegger's speech to the Republican convention in
2004, we find a strong emphasis on the individual. The governor of
California provides a succinct statement of the moderate party position:
If you believe that government should be accountable to the people, not
the people to the government…then you are a Republican! If you believe
a person should be treated as an individual, not as a member of an
interest group…then you are a Republican! If you believe your family knows
how to spend your money better than the government does…then you are a
Republican.33

For the middle-left, scenic elements or changing circumstances provide
the motives for action.
The Origins of Change

Society leans toward consensus, and polarities demand resolution.
Still, new circumstances emerge, requiring interpretations and responses.
The issues and debates that polarize one moment in time come to
resolution and flow from the extreme to the middle, forging a new public
consensus on political issues that were once divisive.
The changes brought by the force of circumstance and the resolution of
earlier divisions force new alignments as the political middle absorbs
an expanded sense of what is ordinary and normal. Thus the political
positions on the continuum are never static in their political stands,
but constantly evolving in a context of change. As we look into the
future, we base our predictions on what we believe are the primary forces
for change surging through today's political landscape.
	Today, three distinct forces are evolving to reshape the political
landscape, giving rise to new polarities to stretch the visions of the
political extremes. On a deep, more slowly moving level, the first force
is the shift in paradigm from science to poetic humanism.34 The growing
emphasis on values, personal narratives, and metaphors of human
experience has marked our public discourse. The second is the cyclical pattern
of American political trends. Having moved rightward for more than
forty years, almost all cyclical viewpoints suggest that we are reaching a
zenith in this swing to the right. History tells us that this
domination by the right wing, with its emphasis on stability and the protection
of private interests, is increasing pressure for a swing in the other
direction toward a more left-liberal public interest orientation.35
These deeply felt cyclical shifts are furthered by the tensions and
contradictions that necessarily emerge in the clash between an ever changing
reality and stable, core concepts held by extreme visions.
Third, as deep paradigm and cyclical patterns evolve, the extreme
radical and reactionary visions face new circumstances, requiring
adjustments and reinterpretations. Within weeks of claiming a broad mandate for
his agenda from the 2004 election, George W. Bush found his Republican
caucus in Congress split on major priorities with factions battling for
control of the agenda. We believe these three forces are presently
emerging in ways that create conditions for the reemergence of a left
leaning middle, animated by an expanded radical vision.

                   Redefining the Terms of the Debate

The polarities that dominated the late 20th century, while still
important in the present, are resolving and drifting to a settled past.
Meanwhile, new polarities are developing to create the contours of the
struggles of the near future. These new polarities can be seen in the
destabilization of key terms that rest in the heart of the visions of both
the radical left and reactionary right. As these terms become stretched
and stolen, the contradictions embedded in them become the touchstones
for discussing what we believe will be the new polarities for defining
the future.
The key terms propelling the redefinition of the reactionary and
radical visions are "nation," "community," and "sacred." We will discuss the
tensions and contradictions clustering around these terms and how each
is introducing new polarities into public deliberations: the
global-local conflict, individual advancement versus a sense of community and
common purpose, and religious fundamentalism versus inclusive
spirituality. The evolving polarizations around these key terms are fracturing both
political extremes, but in very different ways. For the radical left,
the interplay of these tensions offers a potential to enrich and expand
the liberal-left visions. These same trends and terms are having the
opposite effect on the reactionary visions, raising contradictions that
undermine and erode its cohesion and unity.
Although the right wing dominates public discussion at the moment, it
does so in the larger context of the acceptance by the vast majority of
Americans of major elements of the radical perspective. As we look into
the future, we see that the political middle will begin its realignment
to new circumstances with a leftward lean. This liberal-left tilt is
accentuated by two factors: The reactionary vision is being stretched and
pulled apart by emerging divisions within the perspective, and it is
increasingly finding it difficult to provide a coherent, unified
perspective on key issues emerging as society wrestles with the deeper paradigm
shift toward poetic humanism. This mounting tension soon will be
compounded by the newly invigorated liberal vision that resonates much more
fully with the paradigm shift on concepts of community, spirituality,
and equality.

       Global/Local Tensions: Contradictions in Nationalism

The concept and role of the nation state is complex. Until recent
times, however, it has been a fairly stable term in the visions of both the
right and the left, representing a secure place in the political views
of the middle. Recently, as global economic and political relationships
have evolved, this stable concept has become contested. Disagreements
over the role of international organizations, alliances, trade
agreements and the use of military force to secure its interests are
intensifying.
For the political right, tensions between national and global interests
are dividing an earlier coalition. For most of its history, the right
has been associated with an intense nationalism flowing from its vision
of the United States as a nation blessed and chosen by God. This
nationalistic perspective and its advocacy of all things American is
colliding head-on with the drive to participate in a global economy.
Economic tensions are connected to a reinterpretation of God's purpose.
In the earlier right vision America had a special purpose, what Ronald
Reagan liked to call the "shining city on the hill." America was chosen
by God to serve as a beacon to humankind.36 However, that special
purpose is now being challenged. In the most reactionary circles, God's
purpose is no longer attached to a special view of America, but to a view
of the present moment as one approaching Armageddon, or the final
contest between good and evil. Among elements in the reactionary end of the
spectrum the present is cast as the time when the prophecies of last
days are being fulfilled in preparation for the final coming of Christ to
rule the world. In this scenario national interest is important only in
so far as it moves the world closer to the final days.37
Over the last two decades, varying economic interests and
interpretations of God's purpose have complicated the role of the nation state. Such
complications are forcing realignment within the right on the emerging
polarity between global interests and local concerns. Since the early
1980s Republican elites, with the help of some Democrats, have been
moving toward greater participation in the global economy and encouraging
the development of trade alliances and institutions to support the
activities. This emphasis on globalization is often over the opposition of
their base constituencies. In the reactionary right, prominent
representatives like Jerry Falwell reject such efforts at global economic
interdependence. Falwell opposed the establishment of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, while most on the right supported
it.38
The "nation" is no longer a stable term. Long a symbol that undergirded
the patriotism of the right-conservative vision, the term now invokes
differing visions that suggest different policy alternatives. This is
evident in the differences emerging over the use of military power to
protect American interests. The invasion and occupation of Iraq is
supported by those of the Armageddon perspective and contested by those
holding to the earlier reactionary vision. Both Pat Robertson and William F.
Buckley who embrace the vision of the United States as the "shining
city," reject the war. While muting criticism to assist in the election of
George W. Bush in 2004, the votes were barely counted before the splits
in this united front began to reopen.39
Thus the cohesion of purpose provided by a stable understanding of the
key term "nation" is coming apart. The special role of the United
States is being de-emphasized as the millennial visions of Armageddon vie
with earlier biblical interpretations of America's special purpose. As a
result, the extreme right wing base finds itself conflicted as global
trade and military expansion take center stage in national
deliberations. The patriotism-global expansion dilemma fractures a core element of
the right wing vision and over time diminishes its hold on the center.
This dichotomy of nationalism and global expansion is also having an
impact on stable visions of the extreme left. But rather than diminishing
the radical vision, the pull for global justice is enriching and
expanding the sphere of political activity. The demand for equality is
extending beyond national borders to include a greater sense of global
economic justice. The enlarged radical vision advocates equitable and
sustainable development, multilateral peaceful cooperation among nations and
limitations on the accumulation and use of wealth at the expense of
communities. It builds upon the long radical tradition in the United
States. The key term "nation" is deepened rather than divided. Placing itself
in opposition to global corporations, the extreme left is able to
embrace global connections through the extension of concepts of justice and
sustainable development. Likewise it is able to position local control
and national action within a framework of enriching democracy and
democratic processes. Thus for the radical left the global-local tension
strengthens and enlarges its vision.
The rhetorical strategies of the left, however, remain consistent with
earlier radicals. Emphasizing agency, the new radicals look at global
structures of capital and decision making to argue for change. Wendell
Berry places the new vision within the context of the war on terrorism:
I. The time will soon come when we will not be able to remember the
horrors of September 11 without remembering also the unquestioning
technological and economic optimism that ended on that day.
II. This optimism rested on the proposition that we were living in a
new "world order" and a "new economy" that would "grow" on and on,
bringing a prosperity of which every new increment would be "unprecedented."
III. The dominant politicians, corporate officers, and investors who
believed this proposition did not acknowledge that the prosperity was
limited to a tiny percent of the world's people, ... and that its
ecological costs increasingly threatened all life...
IV. There was, as a consequence, a growing worldwide counter-effort on
behalf of economic decentralization, economic justice, and ecological
responsibly. We must recognize that the events of September 11 make this
effort more necessary than ever.40
	In the decade ahead, the emerging contours of this radical movement
are pulling political positions leftward toward greater equality. The
most extreme radical left, currently exemplified by the anarchist-anti
corporate globalization movement, emphasizes the need for new structures
of society rooted in local concerns, emphasizing local control and
sustainable development.
Liberals, too, are drawn toward acceptance of the expanding radical
vision, but remain committed to the current structures for achieving them.
After a year of mass mobilizations against them, for example, liberal
leaders of the WTO began to talk about greater economic equality, while
emphasizing the need to maintain global structures.41

               Community and the Common Good

Invoked by the image of the global, its opposite is the image of the
local. The image of the local is expressed in an emerging discourse on
community, of life lived in connection with others and with place. The
concern for the protection and creation of community is also emerging to
redefine political alignments.
For the radical left, the idea of economic and social justice allows
the boundaries of community to expand. Terms invoking the idea of a
global community or family of nations inform a radical view of a future made
up of vibrant, self sustaining, ecologically sensitive, locally based,
and globally conscious associations. In this view, for the left of
center, government is envisioned as an active, participatory democracy,
where the people closest to the consequences of the decisions have the
power to make them. This view of community is expressed in the radical
slogan, "think globally, and act locally."
The right-of-center conservatives have no such future vision to offer
to those seeking connection and community. Rather, their vision rests on
associations from the past. They often describe the community for which
they are striving as one now lost. They refer to earlier times when
everyone knew their place, where life was well ordered and decisions were
clearly based on principle. In the vision of the right, it is the loss
of community that compels action, not the desire to create it anew. For
those with a conservative orientation, the emphasis on the individual
only highlights the absence of community. For the reactionary, a call to
grand purpose provides little room for envisioning complex association.
At the same time, as relationships between people become more fragile
and as the experience of community erodes, people seek new ways of
connecting with one another.42 In recent years the success of radical left
activities like conversation cafes and political salons orchestrated
through the Internet bear witness to the power of connection. As this
longing for community deepens, the contradiction between the individual
emphasis of right of center ideology and the desire for community will
grow.
This will mean that the extreme right, where the individual ideology is
softened by the experience of a faith community, will not be able to
translate concern for common responsibilities into policy initiatives to
animate conservatives or attract the middle. As the far right effort to
privatize government services escalates, the increasing isolation from
a sense of community life will intensify. Thus we should expect to see
conservatives beginning to separate from reactionaries over the role of
government in providing basic services like roads, schools, fire
protection, hospitals, and other areas of common life. Conservatives are
likely to look back to the earlier emphasis on small, efficient government
and to find alliances with more radical efforts to protect local
governments and communities.
	On the left, the creation of sustainable, productive and equitable
community relationships is at the heart of their vision. Thus the longing
of people for authentic relationships extends and deepens the capacity
of the left to bring people together in a meaningful way. Starhawk,
among the most active voices for the sense of community inspired by a
sense of spirit, provides a glimpse of the radical view in her description
of the anti-globalization struggle:
We have knowledge and wisdom if we choose to apply them, about how to
provide for human needs in ways that respect and enhance the balance of
life. And we have a growing, global community of people committed to
balanced ways of living. In this crucial time, we are called to be
healers-of the earth, of the human community, of each other and ourselves.43

                                                 Science and the Sacred

The search for community and connection provides a foundation for the
tensions around the third key term: "sacred," and its implied polarity,
science. The tensions around the sacred, however, are more than a
simple dialectical tension between science and theology. Complicated by the
paradigm shift form science to poetic humanism, the polar axis between
science and spirituality is compounded by the polarity between a narrow
religious fundamentalism and an expansive inclusive spirituality.
The relationship between religion and politics has a complicated and
often uneasy history in the United States.44 On the one hand, religious
beliefs and spiritual sensibilities have fueled some important left of
center, liberal efforts to achieve justice, just as they have provided
the source of right and reactionary sense of purpose. Religion has been
used to justify liberation and repression. The abolitionist movement,
civil rights movement, and the long history of pacifism in the United
States all share deep religious roots. Likewise, the Judeo-Christian's
foundational belief that God has a divine order for the world is integral
to the right's vision. The idea that the United States is a chosen
nation has a deeply Christian base. Such darker moments of our history as
slavery, a restricted role for women, and attacks on indigenous people
have all been justified by interpretations of religious doctrine.
Whether from the right or left, religious revivals have historically preceded
great social changes and accelerated the drift toward equality.45
Religion, characterized by Burke as an orientation predating science,
influences current understanding of the right as it addresses new and
complicated questions raised by advances in science. The center-right
conservative has a long, uneasy relationship with science. Drawing on a
literal interpretation of the Bible, people identifying as right of
center have often opposed Darwin and theories of evolution as well as
theories of the origin of the universe. Creationism and now the intelligent
design theory offer psuedo-sciences based more in religious faith than
scientific method. More recently some have drawn on religious notions of
the sanctity of life as the basis for opposing reproductive
technologies, abortion, contraception, and stem cell research.
Placing an emphasis on faith over science, the right wing elements of
the Republican Party galvanized conservative-reactionary voters.
However, this emphasis also revealed tensions inherent in the decision to
place principles of faith above science. This was especially evident during
the election campaign and the issue of stem cell research. Nancy Reagan
and her son Ronald openly opposed the Republican Party platform
limiting stem cell research even as the party claimed itself heirs of the
Reagan revolution.46
For many on the extreme right, a literal fundamentalist interpretation
of the Bible provides the outlines of the reactionary social agenda.
Three aspects: restoration of men to the head of the household, the
public honoring of Christian values and prayer, and the protection of
marriage from same sex relationships figure prominently in a vision for
change. They not only reject the drift toward the secular and more equal
world, but also reject the institutional supports for this drift, arguing
that the Constitution has been perverted by activist courts influenced
by liberals. Thus they seek to overturn the legal framework that
supports a bright line between church and state, rejecting both the drift and
structure of the society.
	The implications of this fundamentalist belief are not shared by many
in the conservative, center right arena who join with their left of
center and liberal counterparts in a firm commitment to the separation of
church and state and a broader vision of social tolerance. By accepting
the basic structures dividing church and state the conservative
position separates from the reactionary right. Thus while the extreme
expression of faith over science may energize a base constituency, it alienates
and marginalizes the reactionary right from the more conservative and
moderate Republican middle. Hence the reactionary advocates a view of
the United States as a Christian nation in which Christian principles
should govern public life. Conservatives agreeing with much of the tenor
of this view hold for a more inclusive view of religious tolerance.47
	While the right can be characterized as struggling to reconcile faith
with science, the left is engaging in a reevaluation of this
relationship. Once considered the epitome of reason and objectivity, center left
liberals are posing critical questions about the preeminent role given
to science. Under pressures from the more radical left, some are
beginning to question the positioning of scientific observation and analysis
as the primary source of knowledge. In the more radical area, science
is seen as only one of many ways of knowing. This expanded view of
science has emerged in new age spiritual practices, new physics, paganism,
eco-feminism, and radical religious actions. For example, Starhawk,
writing as a witch and eco-feminist, contrasts the compartmentalized
mechanistic, cause-effect model of science with magic:
Magic is, in a sense pattern-thinking. The world is not a mechanism
made up of separate parts, but a whole made up of smaller wholes. In a
whole, everything is interconnected and interactive and reflective of the
whole…When science and spirit are reconciled, the world becomes
re-enchanted, full of wonder and magic. The great conversation is happening
around us in many dimensions. Magic might also be called the art of
opening our awareness to the consciousnesses that surround us, the art of
conversing in the deep language that nature speaks.48
Like the debate over global-local relationships, this area promises to
invigorate the left-center.

Conclusion

In the coming period the role of science, of religion, and of the
sacred are forcing a new discourse. Tomorrow, we will see conservatives and
liberals addressing spiritual concerns and spiritual needs. We will see
people addressing the suffering and violence in the world with reasoned
dialogue enriched with an understanding of political ideology and the
images of a deep, shared context. Tomorrow, conservatives and liberals
will be talking about not only the bottom line economically but also the
bottom line spiritually.
Democracy is a living concept, evolving, growing, dying, and
regenerating. Political ideology connects us in the present to the vision of the
past we honor and the future we hope to achieve. In the coming years,
as we re-connect ideology and political discourse we believe the United
States will move toward a new vision of a just society living in
harmony with one another and with the earth that supports our life. As people
engage one another to determine the direction of our nation toward
greater social control or greater equality, the broad consensus governing
the political middle will again reassert itself. This assertion invites
a new discourse on issues of community, ways of knowing, the mutual
respect among nations, and spirituality. Another world is constantly in
the making.

NOTES

1. Mark E. Huglen, "An Image of Online Education as 'Poetic Humanism,'"
Kentucky Journal of Communication of Communication (2004), 43-54.
2. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd.
ed. (1935; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 59-66.
3. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political an Economic
Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952).
4. Immanual Wallerstein, "A Primer on U.S. Presidential Elections:
Commentary No. 142, August 1, 2004," Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton
University,  (16 August 2004).
5. Immanual Wallerstein, "Quo Vadis America?" Commentary No. 141, July
15, 2004, Fernand Braudel Center Binghampton University,
 (17 July 2004).
6. Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the
American Rich (New York: Random House, 2002), 405-406.
7. Paul Ray and Sherry Anderson, The Cultural Creatives: How 50 Million
People are Changing the World (New York: Harmony, 2001).
8. Howard Zinn, "The Optimism of Uncertainty," The Nation, 20 September
2004,  (7 November
2004).
9. Vincent Harding, Hope and History: Why we must share the Story of
the Movement (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990).
10. Zinn.
11. Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition (New York:
Vintage Books, 1948), x.
12. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy (New York: Pantheon, 1944), 4.
13. David Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 222.
14. Phillips, 405-422.
15. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986).
16. Schlesinger, 23-25.
17. Schlesinger, 24.
18. Schlesinger, 27.
19. Wallerstein, "Quo Vadis."
20. Phillips, 388.
21. Kofi Annan, speech before the United Nations UN Millenium, New
York: 2002.
22. M. Kaldor, H. Anheier, and M. Glasius, eds. Global Civil Society
Yearbook 2003 (London: Centre for Civil Society and Centre for the Study
of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 2003).
23. Naomi Klein, "Ditch the Distraction in Chief," The Nation, 29 July
2004,  (10
August 2004)
24. Bill Moyers, "Battlefield Earth," AlterNet,
http://www.alternet.org/story/20666 (8 December 2004).
25. Faud Shaban, "11 September and the Millennialist Discourse: An
Order of Words?" Arab Studies Quarterly 25, 2003.
26. Cliff Schecter, "Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party's March
to the Right," Fordham Urban Law Journal 29, 2002.
27.Todd S. Purdum, "An Electoral Affirmation of Shared Values," New
York Times, 4 November 2004, 1, 6 (A).
28. Schecter.
29. David Brooks, "The Ruling Class War," New York Times, 11 Septermber
2004, 31 (A).
30. Arnold Schwarzenegger, "The American Dream: Preserving the Dream,"
Vital Speeches of the Day LXX no. 23 (15 September 2004): 722.
31. Robert Reich, Tales of a New America: the Anxious Liberal's Guide
to the Future (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).
32. Barbara L. Graham, "Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil
Rights: The Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953-2002," Policy
Studies Journal 31, 2003.
33. Schwarzenegger, 722.
34. Burke, Permanence.
35. Schlesinger.
36. David W. Houck and Amous Kiewe, Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The
Public Speeches of Ronald Reagan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993)
327.
37. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Apocalypse (Almost) Now," New York Times, 24
November 2004, 27(A).
38. Schecter.
39. Lou Cannon, "Can Bush Break the Second Term Jinx?" New York Times,
9 November 2004, 23(A).
40. Wendell Berry, Thoughts in the Presence of Fear, Orion Society,
2001, 
(15 August 2004)
41. Mike Moore, "Statement by Mike Moore at President Bill Clinton's
Lunch, WTO's Seattle Ministerial Conference" (1999),
 (21 December
2004).
42. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
43. Starhawk, The Earth Path: Grounding Your Spirit in the Rhythms of
Nature (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004) 216.
44. Howard Zinn, "The Optimism of Uncertainty, the Nation" (2 September
2004),  (9
September 2004).
45. Phillips.
46. Randy Kennedy, "First Lady Defends Limits on Stem Cell Research,"
New York Times, 10 August 2004, 16 (A).
47. Amy Elizabeth Ansell, Unraveling the Right: The New Conservatism in
American Thought and Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998) 167-168.
48. Starhawk, 11-12.