THINKING FOR OURSELVES

A Defining Moment

By Shea Howell

Michigan Citizen, Apr.6-12, 2008

President George Bush finally got something right about Iraq. This last week, he said, we have seen a “defining moment” for that country. It was a moment that stripped away the façade of U.S. control and the legitimacy of the Maliki government.

The moment began when Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki ordered 15,000 Iraqi troops and as many policemen into Basra to eliminate what he called “criminal gangs”. Maliki vowed to crush the militias that have effectively ruled Basra for nearly three years. He even went to Basra to oversee what he called a “decisive and final battle.” In the end, the outcome of the Basra battle revealed al-Maliki as nothing more than a weak, ineffectual U.S. puppet. Moqtada al Sadr, the man whose army he hoped to crush, has emerged as a stronger leader, dedicated to the Iraqi people, and in control of more territory than before the assault. The battle has also undermined the U.S. military claims that the surge is responsible for lessening violence, once again calling into question the administration’s view of this war.

For months the Bush administration, assuming Moqtada al-Sadr's unilateral ceasefire last August was a sign of weakness, has been conducting attacks against Sadr and the Madhi Army, to see if they would strike back. The U.S. would like nothing better than to see Sadr and his army eliminated because Sadr is for ending the U.S.occupation.

Resistance to these provocations had been minimal, and the Bush administration concluded Sadr's was being restrained by Iran and that the Mahdi Army had fallen into disarray. This belief, like so much of the U.S. policy, was based on wishful thinking and the desire to show that the “surge is working.”

Bush, General Petraeus and Maliki have consistently ignored the role Moqtada al-Sadr has played in the reduction of daily violence.

Petraeus especially was convinced that the ability of the Mahdi Army to resist had been reduced by U.S. military actions against it. His spokesman, Rear Adm. Gregory Smith, declared in early November, "As we've gone after that training skill levels amongst the enemy, we've degraded their capability."

Sadr's decision in February to extend the ceasefire convinced Petraeus that they could now launch a large-scale operation against the Mahdi Army in Basra without great risk of a military response.

That assumption proved disastrous.

The Mahdi Army stopped in its tracks the biggest operation mounted against it since 2004. It responded with a fierce resistance, especially hitting government targets and launching attacks at the zones the U. S. called “safe.”

The Bush administration is trying to distance itself from the whole fiasco, saying it has no idea why Maliki launched the attack in the first place.

But in the end three facts stand out.

First, the Maliki government directed a force of 30,000, a number larger than the entire U.S. surge, against what it called a group of outlaws in one city. This attack was brought to a bloody halt by the Mahdi Army. revealing the depth of its strength, commitment, and sophisticated strategy.

Second, the government could not hold the allegiance of its troops as violence spread. In Baghdad members of the police force were deserting, turning weapons over to the Mahdi militia.

Finally, the puppet government propped up by the U.S. has lost credibility and power. "Al-Sadr achieved what he wanted," said Vali Nasr, an expert on Shiite politics at the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "He stood his ground, made his point and showed he, and not his rivals, has the real power in the south."

It should be clear to everyone that the sooner the U.S. leaves Iraq, the sooner the forces commanding the respect of the Iraqi people will restore peace.

Email Shea Boggs Center,